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ENTERING THE DOOR OPENED: AN EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS
OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO GOVERNMENTAL DELIBERATIONS IN
LOUISIANA AND A PLEA FOR REALISTIC REMEDIES
"For as long as any of us can remember, Louisiana has been
dominated politically by the mediocre and the unprincipled ...
men who were colorful, but ... whose public pronouncements
have made the literate wince, the cynical laugh and the sensitive
cry." Former Governor Edwin W. Edwards.1
Section one of the first article of the Louisiana Constitution
states that government, of right, not only originates with the people
but is founded on their will alone.' Despite characterization of the
section as "basically a second preamble, a statement of political
theory rather than of law,"3 the values expressed constitute more
than passing approval of potitical pluralism.' From a legal perspec-
1. Speech of Dec. 18, 1970 in Gris Gris, Oct. 15-21 (1979), at 11.
2. LA. CONST. art. I, § 1 provides:
All government, of right, originates with the people, is founded on their will
alone, and is instituted to protect the rights of the individual and for the good of
the whole. Its only legitimate ends are to secure justice for all, preserve peace,
protect the rights, and promote the happiness and general welfare of the people.
The rights enumerated in this Article are inalienable by the state and shall be
preserved inviolate by the state.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has noted that the underlying prin-
ciples of our government are premised upon the idea of a sovereign people. The Court
reflected that:
Under our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people, who can
delegate it to representative instruments which they create. See, e.g., Federalist
Papers, No. 39 (Madison). In establishing legislative bodies, the people can reserve
to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise be
assigned to the legislature .... The reservation of such power is the basis for the
town meeting, a tradition which continues to this day in some States as both a
practical and symbolic part of our democratic processes.
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1976) (citation
omitted).
3. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
LA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1974). Professor Hargrave is probably correct in reasoning that the
legitimate ends of government enumerated-justice, peace, rights, happiness, and
general welfare-are vague enough to authorize the same actions as "would be the
case if the section were deleted." Id. Yet, it is submitted that the section is significant
in that it sets the tone for the Declaration of Rights, see STATE OF LOUISIANA CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS, Aug. 29, 1973 at 2, and af-
firms the notion of representative republicanism.
4. Nearly a century and a half ago, de Tocqueville recognized the principle of
sovereignty of the American people. He wrote:
Whenever the political laws of the United States are to be discussed, it is with
the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people that we must begin .... In America,
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tive the constitutional declaration's significance is best appreciated
when associated with the concept of "political law,"5 a realm generally
comprised of issues of great public concern dealt with by the state
government or its political subdivisions.' Arguably, no body of law is
more essential to maintaining the principles of republicanism7 and to
attaining local political access than is the state's open meetings
legislation.8 This comment examines the fundamental policies
underlying open meetings legislation and the evolution of Louisi-
ana's constitutional and statutory right of public access to the
deliberations of public bodies, indentifies existing shortcomings, and
proposes modifications that may facilitate the policies of a "govern-
ment in the sunshine. 9
Policies and Principles Arguing for Governmental Openness
Some may believe that public sentiment favoring governmental
the principle of the sovereignty of the people is not either barren or concealed, as
it is with some other nations; it is ...proclaimed by the laws; it spreads freely,
and arrives without impediment at its most remote consequences. If there be a
country in the world where the doctrine of sovereignty of the people can be fairly
appreciated . . .that country is assuredly America.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 33 (A. Hacker ed. 1964). See note 2, supra.
5. Distinguishing between the "'lawyer's law' of the quiet law libraries" and the
"'political law' of the bustling legislature of the strident street corners," Judge Tate
has noted the importance of the differentiation in the context of the judge's lawmaking
role in a civilian legal system. Tate, The Law-Making Function of the Judge, 28 LA. L.
REV. 211, 213 (1968). The classification is also helpful in analyzing the basic policies
favoring the public's right of access to the governmental structure.
6. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 44 provides in pertinent part:
(1) "Local governmental subdivision" means any parish or municipality. (2)
"Political subdivision" means a parish, municipality, and any other unit of local
government, including a school board and a special district, authorized by law to
perform special functions. (3) "Municipality" means an incorporated city, town, or
village. (4) "Governing authority" means the body which exercises the legislative
functions of the political subdivision.
7. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 states that "[tihe United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ...."
8. See LA. R.S. 42:4.1 (Supp. 1976); 42:4.2 (Supp. 1979); 42:5 (Supp. 1976 & 1979);
42:6 (Supp. 1976 & 1979); 42:6.1 (Supp. 1976 & 1979); 42:7 (Supp. 1976 & 1979); 42:7.1
(Supp. 1976 & 1979); 42:8 (Supp. 1952 & 1972); 42:9 (Supp. 1976 & 1979); 42:10 (Supp.
1976 & 1979); 42:11 (Supp. 1979); 42:12 (Supp. 1979).
For a sampling of similar laws in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §
12-2805 (1968); CAL. [GOV'T] CODE §§ 11120-31 (1967); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-6-101-402
(1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19 to 21A (1957); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (1969 &
1978); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 57-601-609 (1967); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 4.1800 (1-3) (1968);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-1401-1405 (1967); N.J. REV. STAT. § 10:4-6 to 4-21 (Supp. 1975).
9. The Florida law opening the deliberations of state and local governments to
the public, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (1969 & 1978), is known as the "Government in
the Sunshine Law." See Comment, Government in the Sunshine: Promise or Placebo?,
23 U. FLA. L. REV. 361 (1971).
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openness is motivated by fear of political corruption and deceit."
While such a position is perhaps justifiable in light of periodic ex-
posure of official wrongdoing, this view is incomplete; other strong
policies also favor a principle of openness. According to one writer,
the public has been motivated to demand more openness by an
"aversion to undue centralization and irresponsible government
revealed . . . in . . . political issues . . . ."'I The core objectives fur-
thered by open meetings legislation appear most evident in relation
to legal issues with which the public is familiar. Basically, open
meetings statutes link the philosophical tradition of government by
consent of the governed to day-to-day governmental activities. As
the authority for democratic government rests on the participation
of the governed, the public must be able to observe and evaluate
public officials, public conduct, and public institutions-especially
when individual members of the public often have an interest in the
governmental action. 2 And "[t]o be well-informed, the public should
have some access to the on-going process of decision making; not only
to what is done, but also to why it is done and what alternatives are
considered and rejected."'" In light of these salient arguments pro-
moting the concept of governmental openness, it is appropriate that
Louisiana law guarantees the public the right to observe the
deliberations of public bodies and to examine public records."
10. See Comment, supra note 9.
11. Id. Moreover, "[tihe increased impact of mass media on society [has] played an
important role in directing public attention to [the] inadequacies and abuses of govern-
ment." Id.
12. See Paul, Public Benefits from Florida's Sunshine Laws, PAR ANALYSIS 1, 1-2
(March, 1978). Mr. Paul further noted that "[tihe continued viability of democratic in-
stitutions in . . . society . . . has come increasingly to depend upon the development
and implementation of 'government-in-the sunshine' laws." Id. at 1.
In his concurring opinion in Reeves v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 281 So. 2d 719
(La. 1973), Justice Summers, articulating a similar view, stated:
Public meeting legislation is desirable for its educational effect, rather than its ef-
fect as a legal weapon. The statutes [Louisiana's open meetings law] should be
viewed primarily as serving to exemplify a public attitude, a mandate to the
office-holder that the people favor and insist upon open meetings.
281 So. 2d at 724 (Summers, J., concurring). See also H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO
KNOW 7-12 (1953); Wickham, LET THE SUN SHINE IN! Open Meeting Legislation
Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REV.
480, 481 (1973); Comment, Access to Governmental Information in California, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 1650, 1650-56 (1966); Comment, supra note 9, at 361; Note, Open Meetings
Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know," 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199 (1962);
Note, The Iowa Open Meetings Act: A Right Without a Remedy?, 58 IOWA L. REV.
210, 210 (1972); Note, Freedom of Information- Texas Open Meetings Act has Poten-
tially Broad Coverage But Suffers From Inadequate Enforcement Provisions, 49 TEX.
L. REV. 764 (1971).
13. Wickham, supra note 12, at 481 (emphasis added).
14. See LA. CONST. art. XII, § 3; LA. R.S. 44:1 (1950 & Supp. 1978); 44:2 (1950 &
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The Constitutional Text
No person shall be denied the right to observe the deliberations
of public bodies ...except in cases established by law."
The succinct constitutional statement is significant in at least
two respects. Louisiana's Constitution is the source of a guarantee
which apparently vests in the public a right not found in the United
States Supreme Court's interpretations of the Federal Constitution.
Although the recent Gannett Co., Inc. v. De Pasquale"6 decision was
based on the sixth amendment right to a public trial, three members
of the Court, specifically reserving judgment on the issue of a first
and fourteenth amendment right of the public to attend criminal
trial proceedings,'7 offered their views on a federal constitutional
Supp. 1976); 44:5-6 (1950); 44:7 (1950 & Supp. 1978); 44:8 (Supp. 1966); 44:9 (Supp. 1970
& 1978); 44:10 (Supp. 1975); 44:31 (1950 & Supp. 1978); 44:32 (Supp. 1968 & 1978);
44:33-36 (1950 & Supp. 1978); 44:37-38 (1950); 44:39 (1950 & Supp. 1978); 44:40 (Supp.
1958 & 1978); 44:41 (Supp. 1970); 44:42 (Supp. 1977).
15. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 3.
16. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
17. Id. at 392. During the past term, the Court concluded that the first and four-
teenth amendments guarantee the public and the press a right to attend criminal
trials. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980). Writing the ma-
jority opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Burger traced the longstanding tradition in English
and American law that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a
criminal trial under our system of justice. The Court recognized that people assemble
in public places not only to speak or take action but also to listen and learn, subject to
the usual time, place, and manner restrictions. Id. at 2828, citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559 (1965); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Specifically, Richmond
Newspapers holds "that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees
of the First Amendment .... Id. at 2829.
While the majority's phraseology portends only to speak of a constitutional right to
attend criminal trials, other Court members manifested a view that the first amend-
ment has a far greater reach. Mr. Justice Stevens categorized Richmond Newspapers
as "a watershed case," unequivocally holding that arbitrary interference with access to
important information abridges the freedoms of speech and press protected by the
first and fourteenth amendments. 100 S. Ct. at 2830 (Stevens, J., concurring). Mr.
Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joined, reflected that the instant
decision may spell another look at the right of access to information issue, see, e.g.,
Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), as the first amendment embodies more
than a commitment to free expression and open communication for their "own sakes."
The first amendment "has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our
republican system of self-government." 100 S. Ct. at 2833 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original). Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in the
judgment.
To the extent that Richmond Newspapers' reasoning is pushed beyond the criminal
trial context, as is advocated in two concurring opinions, the soundness of the analysis
is questionable. Certainly the historical argument, that criminal trials have always
been thought to be open to the public, vanishes when referring to meetings of state
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right of public access. Mr. Justice Blackmun noted that "this Court
heretofore has not found and does not today find, any First Amend-
ment right of access to judicial or other governmental proceed-
ings."'" Mr. Justice Rehnquist reached a similar conclusion, writing
in characteristic fashion that:
Despite the Court's seeming reservation of the question whether
the First Amendment guarantees the public a right of access ... it
is clear that this Court repeatedly has held that there is no First
Amendment right of access in the public or the press to
govermental proceedings .... Thus, this Court emphatically has
rejected the proposition ... that the First Amendment is some
sort of constitutional "sunshine law" that requires notice ... and
substantial reasons before a governmental proceeding may be
closed to the public and press. 9
Although Mr. Justice Powell was willing to address the first amend-
ment right of access issue and to resolve it in favor of the
guarantee, ° the arguments of Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice
Rehnquist seem more consistent with past Court decisions.2
However, another line of contemporary Supreme Court decisions22
and local governments. In addition, perplexing federalism problems might arise if the
instant decision stands for the proposition that state and local governmental delibera-
tions are required to be open to the public and the press, not because of a precise pro-
vision in the text of the Constitution, but under the fourteenth amendment's due pro-
cess clause. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 883 (1976) (Congress may
not exercise its power to regulate commerce by forcing states to choose as to how
essential governmental decisions are to be made).
Ultimately, Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent may prove telling:
"The generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are so indeterminate as to what
state actions are forbidden that this Court has found it a ready instrument, in one
field or another, to magnify federal, and incidentally its own, authority over the
states."
However high minded the impulses which originally spawned this trend may
have been ... it is basically unhealthy to have so much authority concentrated in
a small group of lawyers who have been appointed to the Supreme Court and en-
joy virtually life tenure.
100 S. Ct. at 2843 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 534
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
18. 443 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Mr.
Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall also joined in Mr.
Justice Blackmun's separate opinion.
19. 443 U.S. at 404-05 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
20. 443 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
21. See e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). See Note, The Media,
The Public and Government-Is There a Constitutional Right of Access?, 39 LA. L.
REV. 1005 (1979); Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of the Press-No Special Right
of Press Access to Information, 53 TUL. L. REV. 629 (1979).
22. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assoc.,
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strengthens the proposition that the Constitution does guarantee
the public the right to be informed of the governmental process. In
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Counsel" the Court
ruled that the public has a right to receive the pricing information a
willing pharmacy desires to convey, holding a regulatory ban on
advertisement of drug prices unconstitutional as offensive to the
first amendment. Virginia Pharmacy includes language that "the
First Amendment . . . is thought to be . . . an instrument to
enlighten public decision making in democracy,"24 thus implying that
the Court may be willing to extend first amendment protection to
include a public right to receive information about governmental
deliberations. Yet, while the Court has employed the Virginia Phar-
macy approach to rule that the first amendment prohibits bar
regulations forbidding advertising prices for routine legal services 5
and forbids a municipality's banning "For Sale" or "Sold" signs on
residential lawns," it is unlikely that a public right to observe the
deliberations of governmental bodies will be recognized.
The second significant aspect of Louisiana's constitutionalizing
the principle of public access is apparent upon analysis of the sec-
tion's precise wording and sparse legislative history. Developed in
the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections, the provision seem-
ingly was adapted from a comparable declaration in the Montana
Constitution.27 Literally without debate, an overwhelming majority28
of the constitutional convention's delegates approved the section's
"presumption that public meetings ... are open to the public unless
a specific law denies access."' Only delegate Jenkins, explaining the
proposal, spoke. He remarked that "[t]his won't change any of our
statutes.130 Despite limited consideration of the provision by the con-
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia
Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Note, The Traditional Ban on Advertising by
Attorneys and the Expanding Scope of the First Amendment, 38 LA. L. REV. 259
(1977); Note, Commercial Speech: A Constitutional Protection for Advertising Sales of
Residential Property, 23 LOYOLA L. REV. 1038 (1977).
23. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
24. Id. at 765.
25. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
26. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
27. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 8 states that "[tihe public has the right to expect
governmental agencies to afford such reasonable opportunity for citizen participation
in the operation of the agencies prior to the final decision as may be provided by law."
28. IX RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CONVEN-
TION TRANSCRIPTS, Jan. 3, 1974 at 3073. Final passage was by a 104 to 6 vote.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. Delegate Jenkins also argued that:
Our statutes presently spell out which cases are denied, and really the relevance
of this is to say that in cases where there is no law on the subject that if there has not
19801
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stitutional delegates,31 careful examination of the text in light of
then-existing open meetings statutes 2 helps define the functional
role of the presumption of openness.
Because the right to observe the deliberations of public bodies is
guaranteed, the provision seems self-executory; such a right is legally
enforceable without legislative action." Furthermore, the constitu-
been a specific denial of the right to public access, then access would be allowed
• . . to the meeting . . . involved.
Id.
31. The recorded committee consideration of the section consists of a single
memorandum. See Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections, Staff Memo No. 35, X
RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: COMMITTEE
DOCUMENTS 113. However, the memorandum properly identified both the statutory
problems extant and the underlying openness policies. It stated:
Local and state public bodies in Louisiana have frequently met in executive ses-
sion to thrash out controversial issues before their open public sessions begin. At
the latter sessions, agreements reached in executive session are publicly approved
often with little debate. The public is thus not involved in the final decision mak-
ing process. . . This, apparently, is the typical situation which this proposal
seeks to change.
Id.
32. Since 1952 Louisiana law has required the meetings of public bodies to be
open. See 1952 La. Acts, No. 484. As a statement of policy, statutory language provided
that "[all meetings of ... governing bodies . . . shall be open to the public." LA. R.S.
42:5 (Supp. 1952) (as it appeared prior to 1976 La. Acts, No. 665). Additionally included
was an exception of executive sessions, LA. R.S. 42:6 (Supp. 1952) (as it appeared prior
to 1976 La. Acts, No. 665), and the requirement that regular meetings be fixed as to
time and place. LA. R.S. 42:7 (Supp. 1952) (as it appeared prior to 1976 La. Acts, No.
665). In the event of change from the regular schedule or of the calling of special
meetings, adequate notice was necessary. Id. Yet, probably due to the general
language of the statutes, the scheme suffered from a lack of precision, when exactness
was often needed. The statutes failed to supply a workable definition of a "meeting."
Although section 5 of title 42 of the Revised Statutes was worded in terms of "[aill
meetings," LA. R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1952) (as it appeared prior to 1976 La. Acts, No. 665),
the courts declined to construe "all meetings" in a strict grammatical sense. In Reeves
v. Orleans Parish School B&, 281 So. 2d 719 (La. 1973), then Justice Tate wrote that
gatherings concerning preliminary and administrative matters "which require ... con-
sideration but do not require official ... action" were not within the statutory ambit. Id. at
721. The legislation also lacked procedural or substantive limitations on the availability
of executive or closed sessions. See LA. R.S. 42:6 (Supp. 1952) (as it appeared prior to
1976 La. Acts, No. 665). Moreover, there existed a remedial void for sanctioning viola-
tions. See LA. R.S. 42:8 (Supp. 1952) (as it appeared prior to 1972 La. Acts, No. 669)
which stated that "[iut shall be unlawful for such councils, police juries, governing
bodies, boards or authorities to hold meetings under any conditions contravening the
provisions of R.S 42:5 through R.S. 42:7." Professor Wickham reflects that it is not un-
common for open meetings legislation to lack remedial measures or enforcement
devices. Wickham, supra note 12, at 487.
33. Professor Hargrave has summarized the reasons that constitutional state-
ments and declarations, while often high-sounding, are in reality somewhat impotent.
He wrote:
An ideal constitution would contain only self-executing provisions that are
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tional text speaks in terms of the public's right to observe delibera-
tions of public bodies, rather than to observe meetings." The choice
of the word deliberations is particularly important in view of
previous confusion regarding the parameters of the statutory defini-
tion of a "meeting." In Reeves v. Orleans Parish School Board,35 the
Louisiana Supreme Court considered a mandamus action brought to
compel the Orleans Parish School Board to open its conferences. The
court identified "[tihe key to the problem . . .as the meaning of the
word 'meetings'. 36 While rejecting a broad reading of "meeting,""
the court also refused a wooden and formalistic construction, reason-
ing that administrative "conference sessions" could not "be held
without compliance with the Public Meetings law."38 Perhaps
because the fine gradations drawn in Reeves did not sufficiently ad-
vance the fundamental policies of governmental openness,39 the con-
stitutional delegates chose language expressing more forcefully a
presumption of openness, absent statutory limitation." Yet, as the
constitutional right unqualifiedly applies to "public bodies," whether
the provision will be effectively self-executing is uncertain. Un-
doubtedly, the principle was framed with the intent that the con-
judicially enforceable and that have a clear effect without the necessity for
legislation to implement them. Real-life constitutions, however, are drafted by
political persons working through a political process that often demands provi-
sions which sound impressive but which have little effect. At times, the political
process results in vague provisions that put off to another day the decisions about
the exact contours of a rule simply because the votes for the clear rule were not
there.
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Louisiana Con-
stitutional Law, 38 LA. L. REV. 438, 441 (1978) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as
1976-1977 Term].
34. See LA. CONST. art. XII, § 3. Professor Hargrave has accurately pointed out
the distinction:
Notice the word is "deliberations" -not "meetings." It is broader than simply
"watching the meetings." No matter how a statute might classify meetings ...
the constitutional reference is to "deliberations." . .. The right is with respect to
deliberations, and the presumption is in favor of openness.
Hargrave, speech before 1978 PAR Annual Conference, KNOW vs. NO, A Case for
Open Meetings and Public Records in PAR ANALYSIS 21, 22 (March, 1978).
35. 281 So. 2d 719 (La. 1973). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1973-1974 Term-Administrative Regulation. Law and Procedure, 35 LA. L. REV.
349, 357 (1975).
36. 281 So. 2d at 721.
37. The court reasoned that "[a] meeting may be simply a coming together or a
gathering for business, social or other purposes .... We are satisfied the statutes in-
tend no such crippling limitation." Id.
38. 281 So. 2d at 722.
39. See notes 10-14, supra, and accompanying text.
40. The constitutional provision is limited by the clause "except in cases estab-
lished by law." LA. CONST. art. XII, § 3. See note 30, supra.
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stitutional provision co-exist with a statutory scheme authorizing
the public to observe governmental activity. 1 Specifically, as the
statement includes the proviso that it is inapplicable in cases estab-
lished by law, 2 legislation governing the public's right of access to
and observation of governmental deliberations may remove the
topics treated statutorily from the constitution's self-executing ef-
fect. The "except in cases established by law" clause apparently en-
visions this situation. Specific exemptions from the statutory open
meetings regime pose a more difficult problem: If a legislative ex-
emption from the statutes is a case established by law, the constitu-
tional self-execution is negated; in addition, the statutory strictures
do not apply. But if a subject legislatively exempted from statutory
coverage is interpreted as not a case established by law, the con-
stitutional rule should apply directly. Classification of the legislature
itself illustrates this interpretive problem. Although the legislature
is clearly a "public body," legislative deliberations have never been
governed by the open meetings statutes.' Ostensibly, the exemption
only removes legislative deliberations from statutory coverage and
does not constitute a case established by law negating the constitu-
tional provision." If so, by removing itself from the open meetings
41. See note 30, supra.
42. See note 40, supra, and accompanying text.
43. See LA. R.S. 42:4.2(A)(2) (Supp. 1979); LA. R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1952 & 1976) (as it
appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 681).
44. This proposition is a matter of syllogistic reasoning rather than jurispruden-
tial construction. In short, accepting the major premise, or universal, as the constitu-
tional text's general principle that the public has the right to observe, the minor
premise is that the universal governs absent statutory exception. Thus, if the statutes,
which themselves provide the exception to the major premise, reserve from coverage a
matter, the major premise controls. There is no statutory exception, but merely a
statutory exclusion.
In essence, proper statutory interpretation in Louisiana should not differ greatly
from Civil Code analysis. While the Revised Statutes by no means offer the conceptual
unity provided in the Civil Code, a single body of legislation lends itself to similar ex-
amination. Professor Herman provides insights on the philosophical foundations of the
code method that ostensibly apply to the Open Meetings Act. Discussing a simple ex-
ample of finding facts and meshing governing law, he writes:
[A] hypothetical law student might conclude that the compartmentalization of
reality into forms and particulars is tied to the way he should read the civil code.
When he analyzes a specific transaction, he stamps upon the parties' acts and
communications the presumably immutable forms dictated by the code. In a sense,
the code provides fixed points by which he takes his bearings in history. And the
dialectic between forms and particulars occurs whenever the general code provi-
sions are stamped on specific facts.
Despite the superficial appeals of this description of code interpretation, it
turns out upon examination to be simplistic and misleading for two reasons. First,
code provisions do not automatically stamp themselves upon facts. It is probably
more accurate (though more complicated) to say that the human mind mediates an
[Vol. 41
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statutory regime, the legislature has necessarily placed beyond its
reach the authority to conduct sessions closed to the public. 5 Conse-
quently, regardless of the nature of floor discussions or of commit-
tee debates, deliberations may not be closed to the public, even
when the State Senate confirms gubernatorial appointments. The
legislature probably did not intend this result by exempting itself
from statutory coverage." And it is likely that, were the issue to be
litigated, the legislature's exemption from the open meetings
statutes would be found to be a case provided by law, on the
grounds of the constitutional provision's broad invitation to legisla-
tion. 7 Thus, the legislature is probably subject to neither the self-
executing provision of the constitution nor the open meetings stat-
utes." However, the terse statement that "'[plublic body' shall not
include the legislature"" is hardly a clear expression of legislative
interaction between facts and rules by sifting and weighing data and then by
zeroing in on the proper meanings of the word in the code provisions. Fact finding
and law interpretation are interdependent, intensely complex activities, a point
highlighted by the contemporary methodological debate between the concep-
tualists and the teleologists.
Second, the image of forms stamping their qualities upon featureless wax
assumes that there are immutable laws of human nature that dictate the
automatic and natural recurrence of human actions. The metaphor of the stamp
assumes that the world has a logical structure that is mirrored in a "logical" civil
code. -
Herman, Legislative Management of History: Notes on the Philosophical Foundations
of the Civil Code, 53 TUL. L. REV. 380, 383-84 (1979). See also Levasseur, On the Struc-
ture of a Civil Code, 44 TUL. L. REV. 693 (1970). For excellent explorations into the
mysteries of legal and analytical reasoning, see I. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC (5th ed.
1978); G. GOTTLIEB, THE LOGIC OF CHOICE (1968); N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING
AND LEGAL THEORY (1978); S. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT (1958); A. WHITEHEAD
& B. RUSSELL, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (1910); L. WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-
PHILOSOPHICUS (C. Ogden & I. Richards trans. 1922).
45. Unlike the statutory open meetings regime, the constitutional language is un-
qualified in its applicability to public bodies. It can hardly be argued that the
legislature is not a public body in the constitutional sense.
46. This writer is of the opinion that the intention of the legislature in excluding
itself from the definition of a public body under the statutes, LA. R.S. 42:4.2(A)(2), was
to evade both the constitutional and statutory limitations.
47. Cf. Board of Elem. & Sec. Ed. v. Nix, 347 So. 2d 147 (La. 1977). Discussing the
meaning of constitutional language as "provided by law," the Louisiana Supreme
Court, through then-Justice Tate, reasoned that as "'provided by law' means 'provided
by legislation.'" Id. at 151. See 1976-1977 Term, supra note 33, at 441-45. Similarly, a
court may well conclude that a case established by law means any legislative expres-
sion, even an exemption. For "Illaw is the solemn expression of Legislative will," LA.
CiV. CODE art. 1, and a specific statutory exclusion is an expression of the legislature's
will.
48. However, "[aiction on any matter intended to have the effect of law shall be
taken only in open, public meeting." LA. CONST. art. III, § 15. This provision does not
prevent the actual deliberations from being conducted in secret.
49. LA. R.S. 42:4.2(A)(2) (Supp. 1979).
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intent to create a case "established by law." If the legislature is to
be exempt from the openness presumption, a more explicit statute is
in order.
Direct application of the constitutional text may be a highly
speculative issue, for the controversies regarding governmental
openness usually focus on the scope of the open meetings statutes.5"
And the constitutional presumption of openness, coupled with the
supreme court's identification of the legislative flaws in Reeves,51
made it painfully clear that the open meetings statutes were sadly
in need of reform. That revision has come largely from two
legislative acts, the first passed in 19762 and the second in 1979.11
Act 665 of 1976-A Model Fulfilling the Constitutional Mandate?
Following a year of silence on statutory rights of public access
after the effective date of the 1974 constitution, the 1976 legislature
enacted a considered and coherent open meetings law.' Similar to a
model statute proposed by Professor Wickham," Act 665 of 1976
contained a straightforward declaration of the policy of openness,"
authorized closed meetings according to enumerated exceptions, re-
quired fixing the date and place of regular meetings, in addition to
providing notice of special or rescheduled meetings,58 mandated
50. But, should the statutes be repealed or held unconstitutional, in whole or part,
the self-executing effect of the constitutional provision would then be the subject of
litigation. Such testing of the constitution is not that unlikely. See State v. Guidry, 364
So. 2d 589 (La. 1978) (supreme court's reversal of trial court's holding that the open
meetings laws were unconstitutional).
51. Reeves v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 281 So. 2d 719 (La. 1973).
52. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665.
53. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681.
54. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665. See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the
1976 Regular Session-State and Local Government, 37 LA. L. REV. 168, 170-71 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as State and Local Government].
55. Wickham, supra note 12, at 499-501.
56. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:4.1 provided:
It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that public business be
performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens be advised of and
aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations and decisions
that go into making of public policy. Toward this end, the provisions of R.S. 42:4.1
through R.S. 42:10 shall be construed liberally.
(Emphasis added.) This fundamental statement of policy was not altered by 1977 La.
Acts, No. 707, 1978 La. Acts, No. 456 or 1979 La. Acts, No. 681.
57. See 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:6.1. See also State and Local
Government, supra note 54, at 170.
58. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 amending LA. R.S. 42:7 (Supp. 1952). The creation of a
duty upon public bodies to notify the public of their future deliberations is a significant
accomplishment of open meetings legislation. Present Louisiana law provides that:
All public bodies, except the legislature, shall give written public notice of
[Vol. 41
COMMENTS
keeping minutes of open meetings, 9 imposed penalties for non-
compliance,"0 and established a method of enforcement." In the wake
of the sweeping changes effected by Act 665, only the guarantee of
the right to record the proceedings of the meetings of public bodies 2
was not revamped.
Perhaps the most noteworthy achievement of Act 665 was its
creation of a specific procedure 3 whereby, for enumerated reasons, 4
a public body could conduct a closed meeting. Unquestionably, artful
drafting was demanded by the otherwise unlimited constitutional
rule of openness. 5 Section 6 of title 42 of the Revised Statutes was
amended to require "an affirmative vote .. .at an open meeting...
of two-thirds of the public body's ... voting members present"6 for
entry into executive session pursuant to a permitted exception. Alle-
gations of misconduct,67 the personal characteristics of an individual,66
their regular meetings, if established by law, resolution, or ordinance, at the
beginning of each ...year. Such notice shall include the dates, times and places
of such meetings. All public bodies ... shall give written public notice of any
regular, special, or rescheduled meeting no later than twenty-four hours before
the meeting. Such notice shall include the agenda, date, time, and place of the
meeting, provided that upon approval of two-thirds of the members present at a
meeting of a public body the public body may not take up a matter on the agenda.
In cases of extraordinary emergency, such notice shall not be required; however,
the public body shall give such notice of the meeting as it deems appropriate and
circumstances permit.
LA. R.S. 42:7 (Supp. 1976 & 1979).
59. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:7.1.
60. 1976 La Acts, No. 665 amending LA. R.S. 42:9 (Supp. 1972).
61. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:10.
62. See LA. R.S. 42:8 (Supp. 1952 & 1972) which states that "[aill or any part of
the proceedings in a public meeting may be recorded by any person in attendance by
means of a tape recorder or any other means of sonic reproduction."
63. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 amending LA. R.S. 42:6 (Supp. 1952).
64. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:6.1.
65. See notes 33-50, supra, and accompanying text. By passing Act 665 of 1976,
the legislature expanded the cases "established by law" necessary to limit the direct
governance of the constitution.
66. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 amending LA. R.S. 42:6 (Supp. 1952) further stated that
"[a] meeting closed to the public shall be limited to matters allowed to be exempted
from discussion at open meetings by R.S. 42:6.1."
67. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:6.1(A)(4) was phrased in the
language of "[i]nvestigative proceedings regarding allegations of misconduct."
68. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:6.1(A)(1) provided that the "[d]iscus-
sion of the character, the professional competence, or physical or mental health of a
single individual" is a permissible subject for a closed session with the proviso that
"such individual may require that such discussion be held at an open meeting." The
proviso indicates that the interest to be protected by this exception from the general
rule of openness is the individual's privacy. See note 127, infra, and accompanying
text.
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security matters," litigation or collective bargaining strategy,"0
hearings of the State Mineral Board, 71 or bona fide emergencies"2
were recognized as proper topics for closed sessions." But the policy
of openness was reaffirmed by the provision that "[n]othing ... shall
be construed to require that any meeting be closed to the public.""4
Despite the laudable ambitions and accomplishments of Act 665,
the statute treated unsatisfactorily several difficult areas. Determin-
ing what bodies fall within the ambit of open meetings laws is a
common problem in their interpretation."5 The term "public body,"
which appears throughout the provisions of Act 665, was not
defined-with the predictable and unfortunate result of inconsistent
judicial construction.
Following the mandate" to interpret the Act liberally,7 7 Seghers
v. Community Advancement, Inc."6 held that a private corporation
which was "organized to perform . . .a governmental function, the
administration of the antipoverty program .... [was] a public body
or authority within the intendment of the statute. ' 79 The first circuit
rejected as "too restrictive an interpretation" ° the proposition that
private status was determinative of the corporation's legal exemp-
tion. Seghers' analysis appears correct, given its factual setting; the
agency performed a public function, drew support from and dispersed
69. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:6.1(A)(3) listed the "[discussion
regarding the report, development, or course of action regarding security personnel,
plans, or devices" as a proper topic for closed deliberations.
70. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:6.1(A)(2). This exception applies only
to instances in which public deliberations would have a detrimental effect on the
bargaining or litigating position of the public body.
71. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:6.1(A)(6).
72. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:6.1(A)(5). Although the language of
the permissible exception noted "other matters of similar magnitude" as justifying a
closed session, reading the Act as a whole indicates that the "other matters" phrase
was intended to be construed in pari materiae with the enumerated emergencies. See
State and Local Government, supra note 54, at 170.
73. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 authorized other public authorities to conduct their
business in secret, not because of the subject matter of the deliberations, but as a
function of their character, providing a statutory exemption. See 1976 La. Acts, No.
665 amending La. R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1952) (which declared "the legislature specifically ex-
empted"); 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:6.1(B) (which stated that "[tihe
provisions of R.S. 42:4.1 through R.S. 42:10 shall not apply to judicial proceedings)."
74. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 amending LA. R.S. 42:6 (Supp. 1952).
75. See K. MURCHISON, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW-SUPPLEMENTARY CASES AND
MATERIALS 196 (1979).
76. See LA. R.S. 42:4.1 (Supp. 1976). See note 56, supra.
77. See K. MURCHISON, supra note 75.
78. 357 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
79. Id. at 627.
80. Id.
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tax funds, and established the policies for distribution of public
funds.81
By contrast, a district court reasoned that New Orleans' Mayor
Morial could meet informally with the city council without violating
the open meetings law. 2 In Morial v. Guste8" the fourth circuit af-
firmed the trial court's judgment solely on procedural grounds,
noting that as "petitioners only pray for a declaratory judgment
determining the legal status of Mayor Morial's proposed meeting
in light of R.S. 42:5 .... the merits of the trial court's decision ...
[are] not before us. "84 As a consequence of the procedural disposi-
tion, questions such as what constitutes a "meeting''85 or a "public
81. If this perspective is correct, numerous possibilities are evident for applying
the law's requirements in new and, as yet, untried areas. For example, Professor Mur-
chison notes that law students' exposure to open meetings legislation in other states
has resulted in litigation seeking- access to law faculty meetings. See K. MURCHISON,
supra note 75. In the majority of instances, the students seeking the right of access
have failed. See, e.g., Student Bar Assoc. Bd. of Governors v. Byrd, 293 N.C. 594, 239
S.E.2d 415, rev'g, 32 N.C. App. 538, 232 S.E.2d 855 (1977); Fain v. Faculty of the Col-
lege of Law of the Univ. of Tenn., 552 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). But see
Cathcart v. Andersen, 85 Wash. 2d 102, 530 P.2d 313 (1975). In Louisiana, if a court
were to follow the Seghers' view of the statutory structure, faculty meetings at the
Louisiana State University Paul M. Herbert Law Center would appear to fall within
the legislation's parameters. Law faculty meetings certainly establish policy for degree
requirements, course approval, admissions, and other administrative procedures at a
branch of the state university system, thereby performing a governmental function.
The Law Center and its faculty are financed by public funds appropriated by the state
legislature. Finally, decisions made at law faculty meetings ultimately orchestrate the
expenditure of public money. Of course, if the Law Center's faculty meetings are in-
cluded within the statutory restrictions of the open meetings law, closed sessions
would be permissible for the same reasons permitting any other body to close its
deliberations to the public.
Additionally, this writer has posed, as a hypothetical question, whether the
deliberations of the editorial board of this law review are subject to the open meet-
ings statutes. The literal language of the definition of a "[plublic body," see note 119,
infra, is not dispositive, but the approach of Seghers appears to render an affirmative
answer. While this example may seem trivial, it illustrates the considerations to be
weighed in determining the law's applicability to every bureaucratic and administra-
tive office of state and local government in Louisiana.
82. Morial v. Guste, 365 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d
1375 (La. 1978).
83. 365 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 1375 (La. 1978).
84. Id. at 291.
85. In light of the difficulties noted by the supreme court in Reeves v. Orleans
Parish School Bd., 281 So. 2d 719 (La. 1973), regarding the definition of "meeting" and
the "deliberations" language of the constitution, see notes 34-40, supra, and accompa-
nying text, it may be noted that Act 665 of 1976 failed to delineate adequately which
gatherings of public bodies the statutes encompassed. Consequently, Act 665's provi-
sions were unclear as to whether the legislation applied to all deliberations of a
quorum of a public body, including preliminary/administrative conferences. Act 707 of
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body"86 were not examined.
Essentially, the differing judicial views represented in Seghers
and Morial were occasioned by the legislature's failure to specify
the types of "meetings" and kinds of "public bodies" subject to the
statutory scheme. Such distinctions must be articulated, for a situa-
tion either covered by the statutes or expressly excluded87 is the
"case established by law" which negates the rule of openness."
As difficult and confusing as is determining the ambit of
statutory coverage, Act 665's provisions for enforcement and
remedies for violation are yet more troublesome. Section 9(B) of title
42 of the Revised Statutes added the sanction of criminal penalties,8
which district attorneys were empowered to enforce through grand
jury indictment." At first glance, the imposition of criminal
penalties seems an effective way to secure compliance with the open
meetings law. However, legal and political considerations militate
against using a penal method of enforcement. The instruction that
"the provisions of R.S. 42:4.1 through R.S. 42:10 shall be construed
liberally" 1 is at odds with the longstanding principle that penal
1977 partially remedied this confusion by declaring that adminstrative conferences
were within the coverage of the statutes. 1977 La. Acts, No. 707 amending LA. R.S.
42:5 (Supp. 1952). The Act limited the closing of administrative conferences to the
same procedural and substantive requirements as apply to conducting executive
meetings. 1977 La. Acts, No. 707 adding LA. R.S. 42:6(B). By defining "administrative
conferences" very broadly, see LA. R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1976 & 1978) (as it appeared prior
to 1979 La. Acts, No. 681), the legislature probably intended the category to serve as a
catchall for any assembly of a quorum of a public body. Yet, Morial v. Guste, 365 So. 2d
289 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 1375 (La. 1978), was decided after Act
707 was enacted. In view of Act 681 of 1979, the result in Morial is questionable. See
LA. R.S. 42:4.2 (Supp. 1979).
86. Presumably, the statutes define the characteristics of a "public body" for all
purposes, regardless of the reasons for its gathering. See LA. R.S. 42:4.2 (Supp. 1979);
LA. R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1952 & 1976) (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 681). Ex-
cept in the case of the legislature or of judicial proceedings, see note 68, supra, exemption
from the statutory requirements depends upon the subject matter of discussion before
the "public body."
87. See notes 43-45, supra, and accompanying text.
88. See note 25, supra, and accompanying text.
89. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 amending LA. R.S. 42:9 (Supp. 1972). The penalty upon
first conviction was a fine of not less than $100 and not more than $1000 or imprison-
ment for up to seven days. Recidivists faced a fine of not less than $250 and not more
than $2000 or imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or both. See State and Local
Government, supra note 54, at 171 n.2.
90. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:10(A). Act 707 of 1977 amended the
enforcement provision so as to allow "enforcement ...through a grand jury indict-
ment, or upon a complaint by a citizen who resides within the jurisdiction of the public
body ... or upon the initiative of the district attorney." 1977 La. Acts, No. 707 amend-
ing LA. R.S. 42:10 (Supp. 1976).
91. La. R.S. 42:4.1 (Supp. 1976). See note 56, supra.
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statutes are to be strictly construed. 2 The statute did not require
wrongful-intent as an element of its violation and in effect created a
strict liability crime, unless bad faith was implicitly necessary. 3
Moreover, as a practical matter, leaving the means of enforcement
to the discretion of a district attorney from the same geo-political
jurisdiction as a potential offender seems unlikely to foster an en-
vironment of openness.94
On one occasion the state supreme court considered the validity
of the criminal provisions of the open meetings law. 5 The constitu-
tionality of the statute was raised in State v. Guidry;9" three
members of the Terrebonne Parish Policy Jury and of its Coastal
Zone Management Committee had conferred with other police jury
officials and with members of the regional planning commission. 7
Those present did not comprise a quorum of either public body.99
The trial court held that the statute "involved"99 was unconstitu-
92. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 236 La. 998, 109 So. 2d 896 (1959). See Note,
Criminal Law-Strict Construction of Penal Statutes, 20 LA. L. REV. 600 (1960),
reprinted in L. HARGRAVE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LOUISIANA CRIMINAL LAW 75
(1979).
93. Interpreting the Florida open meetings law, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (1969
& 1978), the Florida Supreme Court has held that proof of scienter is necessary for
criminal conviction. See Board of Pub. Instr. v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969);
Comment, supra note 9, at 370.
94. Professor Hargrave, in recognizing the flaws of enforcement through criminal
sanctions, stated:
[W]e should not place too much reliance upon a criminal penalty as a means of en-
forcing this kind of public interest. It is a cumbersome penalty and is probably too
expensive ... for the benefit that is involved. It relies on political officers, district
attorneys, who can prosecute or not according to their own discretion .... It in-
volves the enforcement of this kind of law with local political matters where, in
some instances, there might be cooperation. It would probably be better to de-
pend upon the private, aggrieved citizen as the one to enforce this right.
Hargrave, supra note 34, at 22. Professor Hargrave is not alone in his view that
criminal penalties present an inappropriate enforcement device in this context.
Another commentator has diagnosed three failings of efforts to remedy open meetings
violations by criminal sanctions:
First, enforcement ... hinges upon the prosecutorial zeal of politically sensitive ...
district attorneys, who are apt to be cautious in proceeding against often influen-
tial members of governing bodies. Secondly, intentional violations ... [are] dif-
ficult to prove .... Thirdly, even if prosecution is successful, the relatively slight
financial penalty is unlikely to loom as a massive deterrent force.
Note, Freedom of Information- Texas Open Meetings Act Has Potentially Broad
Coverage But Suffers from Inadequate Enforcement Provisions, 49 TEx. L. REV. 764,
773 (1971).
95. See State v. Guidry, 364 So. 2d 589 (La. 1978).
96. 364 So. 2d 589 (La. 1978).
97. Id. at 590.
98. Id.
99. The defendants were charged by grand jury indictment with having violated
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tionally vague, violating the first amendment and the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. 10 On appeal by the State,
it was stipulated that a statutory violation had not been committed,
as there had not been a quorum of any governing body or board pre-
sent.'1 The supreme court quashed the indictment without reaching
the constitutional issues."2
Act 665 of 1976 created another enforcement device for use by
the aggrieved public unlawfully excluded from a public meeting. °3
Any citizen residing within the jurisdiction of the public body deny-
ing the right to observe was authorized to bring suit to require com-
pliance with the law, to prevent statutory violations, or to deter-
mine the applicability of the statutes to the public body's discus-
sions."4 Additionally, successful litigants were guaranteed court
costs."
Although the legislature has granted the judiciary broad
authority to determine the applicability of the open meetings law to
particular public bodies and to fashion actual or prophylactic
remedies, °6 Louisiana's courts have declined to exercise their
authority to the fullest. In Buchanan v. State Civil Service Com-
mission,"7 the fourth circuit was petitioned for a temporary restrain-
ing order and a preliminary injunction to enjoin the State Civil Ser-
vice Commission from holding a meeting claimed to be violative of
the open meetings law."' The Commission moved to dismiss the suit
"the provisions of LA. R.S. 42:5 through 42:7.1 by holding and participating in a closed
meeting contrary to the law." Id.
100. Id. at 591.
101. Id.
102. Id. In dissent, Justice Marcus wrote that he "would reach the issue involving
the constitutionality of Louisiana's Open Meeting Law." 364 So. 2d at 594 (Marcus, J.,
dissenting).
103. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:10.
104. Act 681 of 1979 removed two of the standing requirements previously
demanded. No longer must the private individual bringing suit be a citizen or reside
within the governmental subdivision served by the public body denying the obser-
vatory right. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 adding LA. R.S. 42:10(C).
105. 1976 La. Acts, No. 665 adding LA. R.S. 42:10. Act 707 of 1977 expanded the
successful litigant's recovery to include attorney's fees, as well as court costs. 1977 La.
Acts, No. 707 adding LA. R.S. 42:10(B). However, the Act also stated that "[i]f the
plaintiff is unsuccessful, he may be ordered to pay reasonable attorney fees as well as
court costs if the court determines that the suit was of a frivolous nature with no
substantial justification." Id. These provisions are continued without material change
in the present legislative scheme. See 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 adding LA. R.S. 42:11(0).
106. See text at note 104, supra. However, judicial opinion, see, e.g., Buchanan v.
State Civil Service Comm'n, 372 So. 2d 1065 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), has appeared hesi-
tant to order remedies before the fact of a statutory violation. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681
adding LA. R.S. 42:10(C) seems to have adopted this view.
107. 372 So. 2d 1065 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
108. Id.
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alleging that, as any intention of holding a closed meeting had been
abandoned, the question was moot; the court agreed.'" The court
noted that the only relief sought was a restraining order and a pre-
liminary injunction'1 0 and that the meeting had, in fact, been held in
public."' Consequently, it was reasoned that "[any ruling now by us
relative to the legality of the proposed closed meeting would be
purely advisory, a practice the courts have consistently declined to
follow.""' 2 Although the result in Buchanan should not endanger
governmental openness, the court's analytical method may be un-
satisfactory. At the time Buchanan was decided, the statutory text
arguably implied that a court might determine beforehand the ap-
plicability of the law to the deliberations of a public body."' How-
ever, the Buchanan court did not explore this possibility. While it is
true that a court should resist deciding purely hypothetical ques-
tions, the reflexive refusal to rule on the merits of the case upon
mere recitation of the phrase "advisory opinion" is an undesirable
means of enforcing a right statutorily and constitutionally
guaranteed.
In brief, Act 665 of 1976 and later amendments in 1977"' and
109. Id. at 1066.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. Judge Sartain, writing for the court, further remarked, "[i]t is well settled
that the courts will not rule on questions of law which become moot since its decree
will serve no useful purpose and can give no practical relief." Id., citing State ex rel.
Preston v. Henderson, 283 So. 2d 230 (La. 1973).
The problem of providing a reasonable remedy is only exacerbated by the judicial
hesitancy to breach the bounds of justiciability. As Professor Maraist has astutely
observed,
a dispute is non-justiciable if its resolution has been committed to another branch
of the government or to the people through the ballot box, or if the particular
dispute is not presented in a manner that can be resolved through the judicial
process although its resolution has been committed to the judiciary .... The rule
also prohibits a court from rendering a declaratory judgment that does not have a
sufficiently adverse effect upon the parties; when the requisite adverse effect is
absent, the suit for declaratory judgment is said to be one seeking an advisory
opinion, and the controversy is deemed non-justiciable.
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term -Civil Pro-
cedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 556, 556 (1976). However, justiciability need not be a bogeyman.
Proper interpretation and effectuation of the Open Meetings statutes may require a
court to render an opinion that, in other circumstances, might be considered advisory.
This does not mean that the parties have not vigorously briefed their positions,
facilitating a full development of facts. Rather, to avoid a triumph of form over
substance, the bench has the duty, in the context of public-interest litigation, to imple-
ment the legislature's policy statements. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). -
113. However, Act 681 of 1979 appears to have resolved any ambiguity in favor of
the analytical method employed in Buchanan. See note 133, infra.
114. 1977 La. Acts, No. 707.
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1978,15 by establishing a general principle of openness consonant
with the constitution, took giant strides toward opening governmen-
tal doors too long closed to the public. A few significant flaws in the
statutory scheme remained, however, that diminished its effec-
tiveness, particularly with respect to enforcement.
Act 681 of 1979-The Model Reformed
In the sense that Act 665 of 1976 laid the statutory foundation
for the public's right of access and observation, Act 681 of 1979
refined the scheme, correcting many problems. Act 681 articulated a
clear definition of a "meeting" for the purposes of the open meetings
law by eliminating the distinction between a meeting and an ad-
ministrative/preliminary discussion."' The exclusion regarding social
gatherings of members of a public body was retained, however."'
This definition, particularly in the absence of a legislative effort to
limit the Seghers"8 analysis, means that any entity publicly funded
and performing a governmental or administrative function is a
"public body" within the intendment of the statutes.19 The implica-
tions of such a statutory scope are uncertain, and future judicial con-
struction is necessary to clarify the breadth of statutory coverage.
As before," Act 681 continued to except the legislature. 21 Act 681
made no material changes in the general principle of openness, 2 nor
in the procedure123 and justifications for a public body's holding an
executive session. 24 Authority for closed discussions among a school
115. 1978 La. Acts, No. 456.
116. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 adding LA. R.S. 42:4.2(A)(1).
117. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 adding LA. R.S. 42:4.2(B).
118. 357 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
119. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 adding LA. R.S. 42:4.2(A)(2) provides:
"Public body" means village, town, and city governing authorities; parish govern-
ing authorities; school boards, and boards of levee and port commissioners; boards
of publicly operated utilities; planning, zoning and airport commissions; and any
other state, parish, municipal, or special district boards, commissions, or
authorities, and those of any political subdivision thereof, where such body
possesses policy making, advisory, or administrative functions, including any com-
mittee or subcommittee of any of these bodies enumerated in this Paragraph.
"Public body" shall not include the legislature.
120. See LA. R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1952 & 1976) (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts,
No. 681). See note 43, supra, and accompanying text.
121. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 adding LA. R.S. 42:4.2(A)(2). See note 119, supra.
122. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 amending LA. R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1952 & 1976). See LA.
R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1952 & 1976) (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 681).
123. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 amending LA. R.S. 42:6 (Supp. 1952 & 1976). See LA.
R.S. 42:6 (Supp. 1952 & 1976) (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 681).
124. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 amending LA. R.S. 42:6.1 (Supp. 1976). See LA. R.S.
42:6.1 (Supp. 1976) (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 681).
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board, individual students, and their parents or tutors was
specifically granted,"5 although it was perhaps unnecessary.' Since,
however, the privacy interests 7 of students and parents or tutors
are very strong, the legislature properly resolved any confusion in
favor of privacy. Additionally, judicial proceedings continue to be
excluded from statutory coverage."2
Without question, the most dramatic changes wrought by Act
681 are its enforcement provisions. By abolishing the unworkable
criminal penalties,'29 the legislature may have provided an effective
means of enforcing the open meetings law. Under the new statutory
scheme, three entities-the attorney general,' district attorneys,''
and any person' 2 -are authorized to institute enforcement pro-
In Parent-Community Alliance For Quality Educ., Inc. v. The Orleans Parish School
Bd., 385 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), the plaintiffs challenged the authority of
the Orleans Parish School Board to conduct executive sessions for the purpose of nar-
rowing the list of candidates to fill the vacant superintendent position. Interpreting
R.S. 42:6.1(A)(1), the fourth circuit stated that the provision "simply prohibits discus-
sion in executive session of the appointment of a person to fill a vacancy, and has
nothing to do with the appointment of a superintendent who is not a member of the
school board." Id. at 36 (emphasis in original). Moreover, the court reasoned that
R.S. 42:6.1 ...permits discussion "of the character, professional competence, or
physical or mental health of a person" in executive session. . . . In the final
analysis it may be argued the Board could have found some ways in which to
operate more openly, but their general procedure cannot be said to have con-
stituted a violation of the law.
Id. at 39.
125. See 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 amending LA. R.S. 42:6.1(A)(7) (Supp. 1976).
126. The exception relating to the "[d]iscussion of the character, professional com-
petence, or physical or mental health of a person" is broad enough to allow closed
deliberations in this situation. See LA. R.S. 42:6.1(A)(1) (Supp. 1976). But, as the excep-
tions to the general policy of openness should be interpreted narrowly, redundancy is
preferable to omission.
127. Louisiana's Constitution guarantees that "[elvery person shall be secure ...
against ...invasions of privacy." LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).
128. See LA. R.S. 42:6.1(B) (Supp. 1976 & 1979). See note 73, supra and accompany-
ing text.
129. See State v. Guidry, 364 So. 2d 589 (La. 1978). See notes 95-102, supra and ac-
companying text.
130. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 amending LA. R.S. 42:10(A) (Supp. 1976). The attorney
general is empowered to enforce the law throughout the state. He "may institute en-
forcement proceedings on his own initiative and shall institute such proceedings upon
a complaint filed with him by any person, unless written reasons are given as to why
the suit should not be filed." Id. (emphasis added).
131. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 amending LA. R.S. 42:10(B) (Supp. 1976). The statute
requires the district attorney to institute enforcement proceedings upon a complaint
filed by any person, absent written reasons why the suit should not be filed.
132. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 adding LA. R.S. 42:10(C) states that "[a]ny person who
has been denied any right conferred by the provisions of R.S. 42:4.1 through R.S. 42:8
or who has reason to believe that the provisions of R.S. 42:4.1 through R.S. 42:8 have
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ceedings. The action is to be filed in the district court for the parish
in which the meeting in question took place. 3' Furthermore,
recognizing the need for speedy judicial determination of the
coverage of the statutes to a particular meeting, the legislature has
provided for decision by summary judgment, tried by preference."'
Four forms of relief are presently afforded: (1) a writ of mandamus;
(2) injunctive relief; (3) declaratory judgment; and (4) judgment
rendering the action void as provided in section 9 of title 42 of the
Revised Statutes;135 a court may grant any or all. ' Voidability is a
type of relief that previously had been proposed" 7 but defeated.
Amending Revised Statutes 42:9, Act 681 expressed clearly the prin-
ciple that "[a]ny action taken in violation of R.S. 42:4.1 through R.S.
42:8 shall be voidable by a court of competent jurisdiction." 1 38 A
sixty-day peremptive 19 period is given within which suit to void the
action of a public body must be commenced. "
Although voidability, a method used elsewhere,' is certainly an
improvement over the remedial mechanisms previously in force, the
actual effectiveness of the device is questionable. Although the sanc-
tion has been criticized as disproportionate to the evil sought to be
been violated may institute enforcement proceedings." (emphasis added). As the
operative language of the statute is phrased in the past tense, courts apparently are
not required to decide questions of future, potential violations. See notes 108-112,
supra, and accompanying text.
133. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 adding LA. R.S. 42:12(A).
134. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 adding LA. R.S. 42:12(B) states:
Enforcement proceedings shall be tried by preference and in a summary man-
ner. Any appellate court to which the proceeding is brought shall place it on its
preferential docket, shall hear it without delay, and shall render a decision as
soon as possible.
135. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 amending LA. R.S. 42:9 (Supp. 1976).
136. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 adding LA. R.S. 42:11(A).
137. See State and Local Government, supra note 54, at 171 n.25.
138. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 amending LA. R.S. 42:9 (Supp. 1976).
139.. In view of the statutory language that "[a] suit to void any action must be
commenced within sixty days of the action," LA. R.S. 42:9 (Supp. 1976 & 1979), and the
policy favoring speedy judicial decisions, LA. R.S. 42:12(B) (Supp. 1979), it seems that
the sixty-day period is definitive and absolute, subject neither to suspension nor inter-
ruption. See generally Comment, Legal Rights and the Passage of Time, 41 LA. L.
REv. 220 (1980).
140. 1979 La. Acts, No. 681 amending LA. R.S. 42:9 (Supp. 1976). See note 139,
supra.
141. Professor Wickham notes that "[a] number of acts simply prohibit final action
* in closed session and imply that any action taken in violation of the statute will be
considered void. Some statutes go on to provide expressly that the prohibited actions
will be void." Wickham, supra note 12, at 487. See also Comment, supra note 9, at 370;
Note, supra note 94, at 775-76.
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prohibited,' voidability may prove a rather shallow and impotent
sanction when applied to action of a public body adamant in its
secrecy. The following situation illustrates the problem: Public body
X convenes its regularly scheduled meeting in accordance with
statutory requirements. However, while X is in open session, topic
Y comes up for discussion. As topic Y involves a sensitive matter,
the necessary number of members vote to go into executive or closed
session even though topic Y is not one of the enumerated exceptions
justifying a closed session.' The problem would be intensified if
while in closed session X took final action on the issue after a
lengthy, heated, and secret discussion. If a suit is commenced within
sixty days of the unlawful vote to go into closed session, the final ac-
tion taken by X will be voided by a district court. But, once the final
action has been voided, nothing prevents X from meeting in open
session, calling topic Y from the agenda, and instantly taking a per-
functory vote to reach the identical result as in the closed session.
Moreover, public body X might not take final action on topic Y dur-
ing the unlawful closed session; instead, X's members merely may
have voiced their feelings with respect to issue Y and thoroughly
debated the subject, reserving their votes for a later open session.
Though the "rerun" vote is a common problem,"' Act 681 does not
deal clearly with the matter. While the unlawful vote to go into closed
session certainly violates the statutes, the final vote is not so clearly
a violative action. The problem may be resolved through liberal con-
struction of both statutory language and legislative intent. Addi-
tionally, while the statute states that'"[a]ny noncompliance with the
orders of the court may be punished as contempt of court,"'4 5 it is
uncertain that a court could or would compel a legislative body to
take evidence, to engage in discussion, i e., to deliberate.
The problems sketched above are not likely to be solved easily.
One suggestion for approaching the problem of "rerun" voting is to
view any vote taken subsequent to an action violative of the law as
void ab initio."' Therefore, when the public body addresses or votes
142. Discussing Dobrovolny v. Reinhardt, 173 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1969), Professor
Wickham has commented that "[n]ullification is a very drastic sanction ... [possibly]
out of proportion to the evil seen in the violation." Wickham, supra note 12, at 497.
143. See LA. R.S. 42:6.1(A) (Supp. 1976 & 1979). See notes 66-73 & 123-128, supra,
and accompanying text.
144. Professor Wickham describes the "re-run" vote as a consequence of statutes
that define "public access in terms of final action or votes ...." Wickham, supra note
12, at 492. The vital discussions of the public body are conducted and matters resolved
in private sessions. However, as the official "re-run" vote of the public body is taken is
open session, the statutory requirements are satisfied.
145. See LA. R.S. 42:11(B) (Supp. 1979).
146. One writer, analyzing Florida's "Sunshine Law," see FLA. STAT. ANN. §
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on a topic in open session, after previous final action or deliberation
has been voided, the body is considering the question for the first
time. A summary vote, other than on a routine matter, taken
without the public body's hearing evidence or deliberating, would
seem to be action without substantial supportive evidence. 7 and sub-
ject to judicial review."8 The public body's action would then be sub-
ject to judicial scrutiny, not because of a failure to comply with the
strictures of the open meetings law, but because the limits of
allowable legislative conduct had been traduced. While this
methodological perspective is possible, the need to go beyond the
sanctions and enforcement mechanism of the existing legislative
model to compel compliance with the law reflects the inadequacy of
the present regime, rather than providing a workable solution."9
Some Suggestions for the Future
Suggestions for future legislative reform should rest upon a
clear understanding of the public right at issue. The constitution
speaks of the public's right to observe the deliberations of public
286.011 (Supp. 1969 & 1978), has suggested that "any action taken at or resulting from a
meeting later declared in violation of the law is void ab initio and may be ignored .... "
Comment, supra note 9, at 369. This method of analysis seems applicable to Louisiana's
voidability remedy as well.
147. Generally, municipal legislative acts are presumed valid; the burden is upon
the attacking party to demonstrate that there existed no substantial evidence to sup-
port the determination. See, e.g., Allen v. La Salle Parish School Bd., 341 So.2d 73 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 343 So. 2d 203 (La. 1977); Stewart v. East Baton Rouge
Parish School Bd., 251 So. 2d 487 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Moffett v. Calcasieu Parish
School Bd., 179 So. 2d 537 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). A court is not to interfere with the
legislative or administrative fact-finding function unless it is obvious that the
legislative body's action is so arbitrary as to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Landry v.
Parish of East Baton Rouge, 352 So. 2d 656 (La. 1977); Butaud v. Lake Charles, 338 So.
2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
148. Landry v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 352 So. 2d 656 (La. 1977), provides a
recent articulation of the limits of legislative discretion set in the special assessment
context. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that legislative determinations of
fact may not be upset absent a manifest abuse of power. Id. at 661. See Note, Special
Problems of Interpretation Arising Out of Procedure for Levying Special Assess-
ments, 38 LA. L. REV. 1073 (1978). The situation textually sketched above is just this
type of manifest abuse that may trigger judicial review of legislative determinations.
To permit a public body with a legislative function to derogate from the constitutional
principle and the statutory rules of governmental openness by conducting "mere 're-
run' votes after all the vital issues have been resolved in private sessions," Wickham,
supra note 12, at 492, seems manifestly incorrect.
149. The solution should come from the legislature as creator of the open meetings
statutes. Providing an adequate enforcement scheme is not a proper matter for the
courts to resolve in an ad hoc fashion; in the sphere of "political law," judicial capacity
to act is more constrained than in the sphere of private law. See Tate, supra note 5.
But see Chayes, supra note 112.
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bodies. 10 Neither Act 665 of 1976 nor Act 681 of 1979 enlarged this
essentially passive right into an active, participatory one.' This is
as it should be, for the underlying objective of open meetings
legislation is to create a system whereby the public may observe its
government at work,"' and not to sanction interruptions of the
political process by observers."' The characterization of the right as
a passive guarantee is significant in determining whether the
statutory plan is applicable only when a quorum of a public body
convenes." ' It has been suggested that the public's right to observe
should extend to "the activity of two or more members of a public
body gathered to conduct any executive, legislative or administra-
tive business.""' This proposition is correct. Much of the governmen-
tal process is conducted in conferences or at gatherings that do not
fit within the definition of a "quorum of a public body,""' although
150. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 3. See notes 33-34, supra, and accompanying text.
151. See LA. R.S. 42:6.1(C) (Supp. 1976) which provides that "[tihe provisions of
R.S. 42:4.1 through R.S. 42:12 shall not prohibit the removal of any person or persons
who willfully disrupt a meeting to the extent that orderly conduct of the meeting is
compromised."
152. Even the statutorily provided right to record the proceedings before a public
body, LA. R.S. 42:8 (Supp. 1952 & 1972), is little more than a guarantee that observa-
tions may be preserved for posterity. Certainly it does not confer a participatory right.
153. Although it is uncertain what conduct is to be categorized as disruptive,
analogy to United States Supreme Court decisions on the appropriateness of certain
conduct, as protected by the first amendment, may prove helpful. In Brown v. Loui-
siana, 383 U.S. 137 (1966), the Court held a peaceful sit-in by blacks at a segregated
public library constitutionally protected. Mr. Justice Fortas reasoned that first amend-
ment rights "are not confined to verbal expression [but] embrace appropriate types of
action which certainly include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest
...." Id. at 142. Similarly, Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), held
that public school students were guaranteed the right to wear black armbands to class,
in protest of the Vietnam conflict. Apparently, the issue in Tinker was one of balanc-
ing the students' exercise of constitutional rights against the regulations of school
authorities. The standard adopted from Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966), is one that seems appropriate to the context of public meetings. Essentially,
symbolic conduct cannot be prohibited unless it "'materially and substantially in-
terfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school.'" 393 U.S. at 509, quoting 363 F.2d at 749.
154. See LA. R.S. 42:4.2(A)(1) (Supp. 1979).
155. See Hargrave, supra note 34, at 23.
156. See LA. R.S. 42:4.2(A)(1) (Supp. 1979). The following example is illustrative: A
public body is composed of nine members. On a given proposal, four members of the
public body favor its approval. On the same issue, three members of the public body
vehemently oppose passage. One remaining member is neutral or undecided and the
other, though uncommitted, tends to disapprove of the proposal. In this situation much
informal, but significant, discussion may take place without invoking the rules and
strictures of the open meetings statutes, even though the topic of discussion is not a
permissible reason for a closed meeting. For example, the three members holding the
negative view may engage the member leaning in their direction in discussion and
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the public's interest in observing is often quite strong. Of course, if
the legislature were to extend the public's observation right to in-
clude the activity of two or more members of a public body gathered
to conduct governmental business, a concomitant extension of
authority to hold closed gatherings, in accord with the enumerated,
permissible reasons, would be proper."7 Moreover, purely social
gatherings of two or more members of a public body would not trig-
ger the statutory public right.'58
Also an exception to the principle of openness should be made
for encompassing a public body's deliberations on acquiring real
estate. Although eminent domain traditionally has been discussed in
closed session, Louisiana's present law does not so permit. The ad-
vantage of allowing "closed" deliberations is illustrated by weighing
the conflicting public interests involved. On the one hand, the public
persuasively may claim that secret discussion of real estate acquisi-
tions increases the risk that "inside" information will be channeled
to persons who may use it for private gain and not to promote
general public welfare. 9 On the other hand, the public, interested in
observing property acquisition deliberations, is also comprised of
taxpayers who bear the costs speculation adds to the price of public
purchases. Speculation, inevitable when a public body resolves in
open session to acquire real estate, will raise prices and hamper effi-
cient purchasing. 0 Although the question is close, the certain harm
to the public fisc occasioned by public deliberations about property
acquisitions outweighs both the public's right to observe and the
danger of favoritism to insiders. Thus property acquisition is a
special case justifying a complete exemption from openness.''
debate wholly outside any statutory limitations, because no quorum of a public body is
present. Similarly, the four members promoting the affirmative position could divide
their efforts in recruiting others. For example, two members advocating passage of the
issue could discuss the question with the undecided member, while the other two
members favoring approval could attempt to convince the member inclined to disfavor
passage without compliance with the open meetings law. The deliberative combina-
tions not within the ambit of the statutes appear to be numerous. It could be argued
that such are the inner workings of government. But that is precisely the point; Loui-
siana's constitution, with its emphasis on "deliberations," presumes that the public
right to observe follows every decision-making process.
157. See LA. R.S. 42:6.1 (Supp. 1976 & 1979).
158. See LA. R.S. 42:4.2(B) (Supp. 1979).
159. See Wickham, supra note 12, at 485-86; Comment, supra note 9, at 370; Note,
supra note 94, at 771-72.
160. But see Comment, supra note 9, at 371. That author writes:
On the other hand, it can be argued that abuse existed in the past because of the
channeling of inside information to friends and relatives of those participating in
the condemnation proceedings. In light of this ... closed meetings for eminent do-
main proceedings do not seem imperative.
Id.
161. See Wickham, supra note 12, at 486.
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Providing meaningful enforcement and realistic remedies is a
hard task."2 Nevertheless, solutions to these problems are possible.
At common law there was neither a public right to observe the
governmental process, 6 ' nor a history of judicially-created enforce-
ment devices for the modern rights of access. All enforcement
methods and remedial measures are creatures of the statutes confer-
ring the right. While Louisiana's existing 4 enforcement scheme may
appear sound, the sanction and remedy of voidability may prove un-
workable. 1
65
One remedy to the aggrieved, unlawfully excluded public, as yet
untried in this state, is removing public officials from office for
repeated violations of the open meetings law. Removal from office is
a serious punishment, but has been adopted in other jurisdictions 6 '
and has been approvingly noted as "more closely related to the
spirit of the offense .. .... "I Removal from office, like voidability,
has superficial appeal, but closer analysis reveals several disturbing
feasibility problems. As the removal procedure is applicable only to
offenders who unlawfully meet in closed session on two or more oc-
casions, the remedy implies that the initial violations are not very
damaging to the public's interest; in fact, however, the same depri-
vation occurs.' Furthermore, another issue paralleling criminal
penalties is the requirement of scienter. Whether a member of a
public body should be removed from office although he acted in good
faith is problematical.6 9 The removal concept, it appears, is not a
flawless punishment and may prove impracticable.
162. Incidentally, the problem of defining realistic remedies for recognized rights
has long plagued legal thought. Cf. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act
IV, sc. 1:
Portia. A pound of that same merchant's flesh is thine. The court awards it, and
the law doth give it. . . .The words expressly are "a pound of flesh." Take then
thy bond, take thou thy pound of flesh, but in cutting it if thou doist shed one
drop of Chrisitian blood thy lands and goods are, by the laws of Vencei, confiscate
unto the State of Venice.
163. Wickham, supra note 12, at 487.
164. See notes 130-40, supra, and accompanying text.
165. See notes 141-49, supra, and accompanying text.
166. Professor Wickham cites four states-Florida, Kansas, Missouri, and
Nebraska-as the only jurisdictions authorizing removal from office as a sanction for
refusal to comply with statutory mandates. Wickham, supra note 12, at 499 n.99.
167. Id. at 499. Professor Hargrave suggests that a "statute [which] simply says
that if a person violates the law twice, he is subject to removal from office on the peti-
tion of any citizen. . . .would probably be more effective than the normal kind of
criminal proceeding." Hargrave, supra note 34, at 23.
168. Additionally, if, as with other "repeater" penalties, prior offenses are to be
erased from the offender's record after a specified time has passed, the length of time
will require determination. Presumably, the time should, in this instance, be rather
lengthy.
169. Foreseeing the problem, Professor Wickham contends that "[bly limiting
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If criminal sanctions and voidability are too unwieldy to promote
efficient statutory operation, legislative creation of "a realistic
remedy to individuals who are aggrieved"'7 ° will be difficult. One
remedy, directly compensating persons unlawfully excluded, has
been uniformly overlooked;' individuals deprived of their obser-
vatory right could be authorized to bring personal damage suits. An
unauthorized exclusion from the deliberations of a public body
should satisfy, under general tort principles, the necessary elements
for breach of a statutory duty.17 But absent compensable injury, an
action brought under the present statutory scheme would fail. The
plaintiff in a tort action must prove his damages, and the injury an
individual suffers from exclusion probably would result in only
minor monetary injury. However, to promote the policy of govern-
mental openness, the legislature could stipulate the damages that
aggrieved individuals may recover in private actions. This remedy
should not effect a windfall recovery for individuals; rather, the
damage action would provide an incentive for individuals to sue, pro-
moting openness and individual participation in government. Also,
stipulated damages should serve to deter closed session delibera-
tions in violation of the law.'
removal to repeating violators and by giving them a right to a jury trial . . . there
would be sufficient safeguards for officials who act in good faith." Wickham, supra note
12, at 499. Unfortunately, the implications of a jury trial "safeguard" notion are left
undeveloped.
170. Hargrave, supra note 34, at 23.
171. See Wickham, supra note 12, at 487.
172. It is well established that Louisiana's tort law, employing the duty/risk
analysis, draws analogical inferences from statutory requirements and prohibitions to
fix a reasonable standard of care. See, e.g., Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164 (La.
1978); Weber v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of New York, 273 So. 2d 30 (La. 1973); Laird v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714 (1972); Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257
La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821 (1970); Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage
Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962). Commentators have articulated the analytical
method. See, e.g., Chamallas, Comparative Fault and Multiple Party Litigation in
Louisiana: A Sampling of the Problems, 40 LA. L. REV. 373 (1980); Johnson, Compar-
tive Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 LA. L. REV. 319 (1980); Robertson,
Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin and
Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. REV. 1 (1973); Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It
Yourself versus American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363 (1970); Note,
Abrogation of the Contributory Negligence Bar in Cases of Disparate Risks, 39 LA. L.
REV. 637 (1979).
173. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970) providing that:
Any person whose [communication] is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation
of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action against any person who in-
tercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or
uses such communication, and (2) be entitled to recover from any such person-
(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the
rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1000, whichever is higher;
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Conclusion
Despite its shortcomings, the -statutory scheme of Act 665 of
1976, substantially improved by Act 681 of 1979, is a definite step
toward implementing the constitutional goal of openness and toward
fostering the public interest in responsible government. Given
clarification as to which groups are "public bodies," evaluation of
the reasons justifying closed sessions, and development of realistic
remedies and effective enforcement devices, Louisiana's open
meetings law should ensure both better government and a more in-
formed populace. The problems that exist are not insolvable and are
well worth attention, in light of the statutes' social significance. As
Louisiana now faces the last two decades of the century, state and
local government will, hopefully, cease to be the bastion of secrecy
and the refuge for the cynical.
Bruce V. Schewe
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably in-
curred ....
(Emphasis added).
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